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Abstract 
A widely recognized paper by Colin Mayer (1988) has led to a profound revision of academic 
thinking about financing patterns of corporations in different countries. Using flow-of-funds data 
instead of balance sheet data, Mayer and o thers who followed his lead found that internal 
financing is the dominant mode of financing in all countries, that financing patterns do not differ 
very much between countries and that those differences which still seem to exist are not at all 
consistent with the common conviction that financial systems can be classified as being either 
bank-based or capital market-based. This leads to a puzzle insofar as it calls into question the 
empirical foundation of the widely held belief that there is a correspondence between the 
financing patterns of corporations on the one side, and the structure of the financial sector and the 
prevailing corporate governance system in a given country on the other side.  
 
The present paper addresses this puzzle on a methodological and an empirical basis. It starts by 
comparing and analyzing various ways of measuring financial structure and financing patterns 
and by demonstrating that the surprising empirical results found by studies that relied on net 
flows are due to a hidden assumption. It then derives an alternative method of measuring 
financing patterns, which also uses flow-of-funds data, but avoids the questionable assumption. 
This measurement concept is then applied to patterns of corporate financing in Germany, Japan 
and the United States. The empirical results, which use an estimation technique for determining 
gross flows of funds in those cases in which empirical data are not available, are very much in 
line with the commonly held belief prior to Mayer’s influential contribution and indicate that the 
financial systems of the three countries do indeed differ from one another in a substantial way, 
and moreover in a way which is largely in line with the general view of the differences between 
the financial systems of the countries covered in the present paper. 
   1
I  Introduction 
More than ten years after Harris and Raviv (1991) concluded in their survey article that the 
theoretical research on asymmetric information and capital structure has reached the point of 
diminishing marginal returns, the gap between this very theory and the empirical evidence on 
firms’ capital structures seems to have become even wider. Fama and French (2002) acknowledge 
in the last sentence of their extensive empirical study that they “[…] cannot tell whether the results 
are due to trade-off forces, pecking order forces, or indeed other factors overlooked by both.”
1 
Hence, whether firms’ financing decisions are determined more by transaction cost of issuing new 
securities and the extent of informational asymmetries between management and investors as 
suggested by the pecking order model (Myers 1984) or more by management attempts to achieve 
optimal leverage levels by trading-off the benefits - e.g. tax deductibility of interest and reduction 
of free cash flow problems - and the costs – e.g. bankruptcy cost and agency conflicts between 
stockholders and debt holders - of taking on extra debt is still not fully understood. 
Whereas empirical tests that rely on panel data hence struggle to reach consensus concerning 
the determinants of capital structure, most studies based on aggregate country data have indeed 
derived the very same results with respect to international differences of financing behaviors of 
firms. Because “retained earnings are by far and away the dominant source of finance in all 
countries” (Mayer and Sussman 2002) and because “differences in leverage across the G -7 
countries are not as large as previously thought” (Rajan and Zingales 1995), "[t]he celebrated 
distinction between the market based financial pattern of the United Kingdom and the United 
States and the bank-based pattern of Germany is inaccurate"(Corbett and Jenkinson 1997).
2 These 
results are important not only because they challenge established views, but also because they lead 
to a research puzzle
3: There does not seem to be a correspondence between the financing patterns 
of corporations in a given country on the one side and the prevailing corporate governance system 
in that country on the other side - a correspondence which the theory of incomplete contracts 
would lead one to expect (La Porta et al., 1997). In fact, one would expect the financing patterns to 
"fit" the governance systems in the sense that those to whom the governance system gives most 
                                                             
1 Schmid Klein et al. (2002) finish off their survey article on recent contributions in that area by stating that the lack of 
support for prevailing theories suggests that additional work is needed on both fronts. 
2 For similar results see e.g. Mayer (1988, 1990), Mayer and Alexander (1990), Bertero (1994), Edwards and Fischer 
(1994), Prowse (1995), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Corbett and Jenkinson (1996). 
3 Mayer's findings are also classified as an extremely stimulating puzzle and discussed at length in Mishkin (1998), 
chapter 9. See also Schmidt and Tyrell (1997).   2
power to influence the policies of the corporations would also be the main providers of funds, and 
there can hardly be a doubt that governance systems differ widely between countries.  
In our paper we address the "net-flow puzzle" created by the empirical studies of Mayer (1988) 
and those who followed his lead on methodological and empirical grounds. To that aim we 
demonstrate that all studies that rely on aggregate net flows of funds between economic sectors 
make one critical implicit assumption concerning the question which sources of funds finance 
which uses of funds. It is assumed that new external funds like bank loans to the enterprise sector 
are first used to repay any outstandings of the same type of financial instrument and that only the 
remainder, i.e. the net flow from the banking sector to the non-financial enterprise sector in a 
given period, which may be positive or negative, is used for financing real investment. Because by 
definition internal funds do not have to be repaid, they are assumed to fully flow into investment. 
Only in the rare cases in which the volume of internal funds exceeds that of investment, the excess 
of internal funds over investment is assumed to be used to repay debt or repurchase equity. It 
appears to us that, for answering the question of how investment is f inanced, this arbitrary 
assumption is not warranted. Nevertheless, the assumption is responsible for the results at which 
Mayer and his followers arrive, and that it overestimates the role of internal funds and 
underestimates that of external sources of the financing of investments. 
In this paper we propose an alternative method of measuring financing patterns, which is very 
close in its spirit to previous aggregate studies, but avoids the critical assumption. The empirical 
results which the alternative concept yields turn out to be in line with expectations grounded in 
financial system theory as well as with commonly held beliefs about the dominance of banks as a 
source of financing in Germany and Japan and of markets as a source in the case of US firms. Our 
empirical results suggest that the overlooked determinants mentioned by Fama/French may in fact 
be found in the institutional context and the ownership structures of firms. Such an explanation 
has been largely ruled out by existing empirical studies, which could not find systematic 
international differences in financing patterns. 
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we examine the basic approaches to 
measuring financing patterns using a simple numerical example. We derive five observations that 
we use in section III to briefly discuss the relevant empirical literature. Inter alia we will reveal the 
critical assumption implicit in all net-flow studies in the spirit of Mayer (1988) and argue that net 
flows only indicate the change in importance of various financing sources, but not the importance   3
itself. Section IV also builds upon the observations and presents a new measurement concept that 
is based on gross flows and thereby avoids the critical assumption. The concept is applied to the 
enterprise sectors of Germany, the United States and Japan and offers a fresh look at international 
differences in financing patterns, i.e. in the relative importance of financing flows from various 
internal and external sources in funding investment. By adjusting gross flows based on average 
maturity information we demonstrate that international differences in financial patters, which we 
define as the relative importance of financial flows of funds in financing investment, can be easily 
reconciled with international differences in financial structures, which we define as the relative 
importance of various liability and equity items as they are reflected on firms’ balance sheets. 
Section V concludes by discussing the implications our results might have for future empirical and 
theoretical work on firms’ capital structures and the comparison of financial systems. 
 
II  The measurement of financing patterns 
A)  Alternative measurement concepts and their results for a simple example 
There are at least six general conceptual ways to analyze the financing patterns and financing 
structures. One can either examine (i) data on gross flows from specific financing instruments, (ii) 
data on net flows – i.e. gross inflows minus gross outflows for the same type of instrument - or 
(iii) data on levels – i.e. accumulated net flows plus any value changes. For each of the three 
options one can then either (a) examine individual company accounts or (b) look at sector 
aggregates as they are reported in National Accounts Statistics.
4  
Providers of company account data, such as Global Vantage or Compustat, use annual 
statements of selected firms to build their datasets. These datasets comprise items from balance 
sheets, income- and cash flow statement. Aggregate sector data are typically provided by the 
central bank or the statistical office of a country and cover the entire non-financial company 
sector. For some countries the sector accounts are further broken down for subsectors such as 
corporations, farming or housing enterprises. The reported time series are partly based on 
individual company accounts but to a much larger extent on already aggregated data provided by 
banks, stock exchanges or other financial institutions. As a consequence, National Account 
Statistics almost exclusively contain data on levels and net-flows but hardly any gross flow data. 
                                                             
4 Moreover, one can distinguish between time periods. For example, Mayer/Sussman (2002) compare firm-years, 
during which firms experienced particularly high investment expenditures and hence can be assumed to have a higher 
demand for external financing to those firm-years with normal levels of investment expenditures.   4
Furthermore, levels and net flows are adjusted for intrasectoral transactions and hence correspond 
to intersectoral claims and liabilities of all sectors.
5 
Each of the six measurement concepts has its strengths and weaknesses and is hence better 
suited to answer some questions and less appropriate to answer others. In choosing between 
individual company accounts and aggregated sector accounts one essentially trades off 
possibilities to t est theories on the determinants of financial structure of firms from the same 
country against possibilities to compare the roles of various financing sources in funding 
investment across countries and longer time periods. 
Data from individual companies’ financial statements are much more detailed than aggregate 
sector data and allows for panel analysis. However, they are typically only available for the largest 
corporations of a given country and as such they are not necessarily representative of all firms in 
that country. Secondly, differences in accounting standards often make comparisons among firms 
from different countries problematic. Thirdly, analyses of long-term developments in financing 
behavior are difficult as the available data in most sources only dates back one or two decades. 
The providers of National Accounts Statistics have undertaken many efforts in recent years to 
standardize both the compilation and the presentation of outstandings and net flows. Although 
some discrepancies in terms of sector definitions and instrument classifications still remain, total 
sector coverage, international comparability and availability of historical data is arguably superior 
to that of most databases containing individual company accounts. At the same time, regression 
analysis is hardly possible due to the high level of data aggregation. 
The trade-off that comes with the choice between levels, net flows and gross flows is more 
subtle. The simple example in Table 1 below clarifies the differences between the three broad 
measurement concepts and also points out their major strengths and weaknesses.
6 It thereby 
attempts to disentangle some important misunderstandings concerning the questions that can be 
answered by each of them. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Columns 2 to 10 in the upper part of panel A show gross and net flow figures for the firms A, 
B and C in the three periods 1 to 3. Levels are reported in the lower part of panel A. For each firm 
and all periods, the flows of internal funds are 10 and the levels of paid-in equity are 5. The firms 
are identical, except that each firm experiences an investment spike in another of the three periods. 
                                                             
5 For example, industrial crossholdings of equity shares and trade credit among firms are often consolidated and are 
hence not reported in the National Account Statistics. 
6 Refer to Mayer/Sussman (2002) for a representation that is very similar in construct.   5
Investment spikes are defined here as investments that are four times as high as in normal times. 
Investments are always financed from available internal sources as much as possible and only if 
internal funds are not sufficient they are financed from external sources. Any excess internal funds 
are used to repay liabilities or to acquire liquid assets that serve as a store of liquidity. As a 
consequence, firm A, which has an investment spike in period 1, has to finance half of the 
investment externally, e.g. by taking out a bank loan of 10. Firm B, which mainly invests in period 
2, has at that time already accumulated 5 units in internal funds through prior accumulation of 
liquid assets and hence only requires 5 units of external funds to finance the investment spike. 
Firm C is able to finance its entire investment spike by means of internal funds that have been 
generated and accumulated during periods 1 to 3. Panel B provides the aggregated company 
accounts from panel A for each single period and, in the last column, averaged over periods 1 to 3. 
Insert Table 2 here 
The six general measurement concepts imply remarkably different answers to the question 
“How is investment financed?”. This question was chosen by Jenny Corbett and Tim Jenkinson 
(1997) as the title of their influential empirical study of firms’ financing patterns in five countries. 
Following their approach of measuring aggregate net flows for the entire sector yields a portion of 
0 percent for external funds in total investment and consequently a portion of 100 percent for 
internal funds (see Table 2 above). If the concept recently proposed by Mayer/Sussman (2002) is 
applied, i.e. if only net financing flows of firm-years, during which the firms experienced an 
investment spike, are considered, one arrives at a portion of 25 percent for external net funds; and, 
because no debt repayments occur in the spike years in our example one arrives at the very same 
portion for gross funds. Measuring financing patterns based on gross inflows into the entire sector 
constitutes a third alternative and yields an average portion of external funds in investment of 16.7 
percent. We will argue in section IV that the third alternative constitutes the most appropriate way 
of measuring the roles of various sources in funding investments. We hence consider it also as the 
most appropriate way of comparing financing patterns across countries and time intervals. 
The example also allows for the measurement of capital or financing structures. Based on the 
level data provided in the lower panel of Table 1, three different leverage ratios can be computed. 
One can compute the ratio of debt over total liabilities and equity for each single firm in the 
sample and then build the average across all firms (three-period average: 18.5 percent; third line in 
Table 2) or alternatively, across the subsample of firms with investment spikes (three-period 
average: 38.9 percent). Thirdly, one can directly compute the sector leverage ratio by using the   6
corresponding items from the consolidated balance sheet in the last column of the table (three-
period average: 26.7 percent).
7 
B)  Observations and implications 
The following five observations summarize what appears to us as the main insights to be 
drawn from the example.
8 They point out the mechanisms that are responsible for the 
discrepancies between the results from different measurement approaches. We will later build 
upon these observations to discuss the relevant empirical literature and to develop and implement 
a new measurement concept. 
Observation 1: Net flows NFt,i for instrument i - defined as the difference between gross inflows 
IFt,i and gross outflows OFt,i from the same period t - equal the first difference in end-of-period 
nominal levels Li.   
(1)  NFt,i = IFt,i - OFt,i = Lt,i – Lt-1,i   
In our example, which only reports nominal values, this proposition holds for both debt-
financing and the purchasing of liquid assets. Indeed, equation (1) also holds for most data 
series in National Account Statistics. Exceptions only occur if levels are reported at their 
market values or if levels are affected by flow items not fully reflected in the corresponding 
flows series. The two most prominent examples for the second exception are retained earnings 
in the case of equity and conversions of convertible bonds into equity in the case of equity and 
bonds. Hence, for all but a few instruments, time series of net flows do not contain m ore 
information than time series on levels. 
Observation 2: Net flows indicate growth patterns of levels.    
Over the lives of any debt instrument, the sum of gross inflows into each firm and also into the 
entire sector must equal the sum of gross outflows in the form of repayments and of obligations 
that had not been met, e.g. because of loan defaults.
9 Hence, accumulated net flows from debt 
instruments are by definition only positive if not all inflows are repaid during the observation 
                                                             
7 See Rajan/Zingales (1995) for an application of the first and the third concept. 
8 There area number of secondary insights that can be drawn from Tables 1 and 2. It becomes apparent, for example, 
that financing patterns are the same for aggregated single company accounts and for the entire sector accounts as long 
as the companies in the sample represent the entire sector. Computing weighted averages across flow figures from all 
single company accounts is conceptually equivalent to computing the same ratios for sector accounts. Financing 
patterns for spike years deviate from sectoral patterns because the exclusive focus on company years in which capital 
expenditures strongly exceed internal funds overemphasizes the role of gross inflows from debt financing. 
9 Again, convertible bonds are an exception to this rule, as they can be converted into equity shares. In this case 
repayments via dividends and share buybacks do not necessarily match the original inflows into the firm.   7
period. They are higher the more the amount of debt outstanding at the end of the observation 
period exceeds the beginning balance. Net inflows thus mainly indicate the growth path of 
corresponding levels. As a consequence, empirical studies based on aggregate net flows can 
only provide evidence on the change in the relative importance of different external funding 
sources, but typically do not reveal the general importance of different funding sources in 
financing investment.  
Observation 3: Internal funds are conceptually different from other financing sources.    
Because internal funds are not “repaid”, there are no corresponding gross outflows. Therefore, 
net internal inflows equal gross internal gross inflows. This implies that if one compares net 
flows from external sources over investment to internal funds over investment, one implicitly 
assumes that external inflows are firstly used to make repayments to external claimants and that 
only the remainder is used to finance investment. In sharp contrast, all internal funds are 
assumed to be exclusively used to finance investment. This problem of a preset allocation of 
sources to uses is aggravated if aggregate firm data is analyzed. Gross inflows for some firms 
are implicitly assumed to be used for repayments of liabilities of other firms in the sample. In 
our view, this arbitrary allocation of sources to uses is a critical assumption inherent in all 
aggregate net flow studies. And it is precisely this assumption that drives one of their main 
results, namely that internal funds a re by far the most important source for financing 
investment, as quoted above. One possibility to fix the problem of systematically 
overestimating the relative role of internal funds is to use external gross flows instead of 
external net flows. If one proceeded in this way, no assumption concerning the use of funds 
from specific sources would be made at all. Rather, it would be postulated that each financing 
source can in principle be used to finance any real or financial investment or to repay any 
liability. 
Observation 4: Levels can be reconstructed from past gross inflows.    
Levels or outstandings of a given financing instrument are the outcome of the entirety of gross 
inflows, gross outflows (which are themselves a function of past gross inflows) and any value 
changes for that instrument that may have occurred in the past. If annual gross inflows are 
constant across time and if levels are reported at nominal values, the steady-state relationship 
between gross inflows and levels is determined by the duration of the stream of repayments 
(gross outflows). Because interest payments are neither considered in our example nor in the   8
data series from National Account Statistics a simplified duration concept can be used, in which 
the interest rate is set to zero (see equation (2)). To avoid confusion with the standard duration 
concept, we henceforth use the term average maturity instead, which we denote by mi.  
  (2)  ￿
=
= ￿ =
n
t
t i t i i IF OF t m
1
0 , ,    
Consider the following example for a given firm: Annual gross inflows from new debt are 10 in 
each year and all debt matures after 5 years on average. In a steady state, the nominal value of 
outstandings must equal 50 - irrespective of the repayment schedule, i.e. the exact timing of 
repayments around the average maturity.
10 In a second scenario, in which liabilities are repaid 
after one year on average, outstandings must equal gross inflows in a steady state. Outstandings 
in this scenario are nothing but the gross inflows that have accumulated during the previous 
twelve-month period.   
In the latter case of stable one-year average maturities, the simple relationship also holds for 
situations in which gross inflows grow at a constant rate g„0. If, however, average maturities 
are greater than one for instruments with nonzero growth rates, levels are no longer exclusively 
determined by mi but also by gi,t and to a smaller extent also by the exact form of the repayment 
schedule. Consider again the simple example: Assume that gross inflows IFi,t from instrument i 
have been growing at an annual growth rate g i since the 1970s and that they have reached 
IFi,1990=100 in 1990. Further assume that instrument i matures after 10 years on average and 
that the bulk of repayments occurs around that average maturity.
11  In 2000, gross inflows are 
greater than they were in 1990 by the factor (1+gi)
10 and hence IFi,2000 equals 100*(1+gi)
10. 
Gross outflows reflect gross inflows from m i years ago. Hence, OFi,2000 must approximately 
equal IFi,1990 and, as a consequence, must be about the same as IFi,2000(1+gi)
-mi  = 100. 
                                                             
10 Provided that the repayment schedule is constant across time it does not make a difference whether the 100 in debt 
are repaid in full after 5 years or whether for example, 50 are repaid in year two and year nine. The relationship also 
holds for our example from Table 1. The debt of firm A (firm B) matures on average after 1,5 (one) periods. The 
weighted average maturity m for the entire sector thus equals 4/3. Multiplying average gross inflows, which amount to 
5 over the three periods, by 4/3 yields 6 2/3, which is precisely the average liability level over all three periods. 
11 We analyzed numerically the impact of the exact timing of repayments on the accuracy of observation 4 and hence 
on the extent to which it can be generalized (the corresponding tables are available from the authors on request). If the 
stream of repayments is bell shaped, steady-state inflows as implied by equation (4) deviate from true inflows by (far) 
less than 3 percent for growth rates below 20 percent and for average maturities greater than 5 years. Deviations are 
slightly larger for schedules that either increase or decrease in a monotonous fashion and for an evenly distributed 
stream of repayments. Deviations are largest for schedules with bulks of payments in the beginning and in the end 
(roughly 10 percent for a 20 percent growth rate and an average maturity of 6 years).However, the larger a sample, the 
more should the stream of total repayments of the entirety of firms converge to a skewed bell-shape and hence the 
more accurate we expect equation (4) to be.    9
Subtracting year-2000 gross outflows from year-2000 gross inflows yields net flows NFi for the 
year 2000. NFi,2000 must by definition also equal the difference between year-end 2000 levels 
and 1999 levels. Because gross flows have grown at g i during the nineties, the same must hold 
for levels L i, so that the difference in levels can also be written as Li,2000 – L i,2000(1+gi)
-1. We 
obtain the following general relationship between gross flows for a given year and levels at the 
end of the year.   
(3)  Li,t – Li,t (1+gi,t)
-1 = NFi,t = IFi,t - IFi,t (1+gi,t)
-mi,t   
Solving (3) for IFi,t yields  
(4)  IFi,t = Li,t (1 - (1+gi,t)
-1) / (1 - (1+gi,t)
 -mi),
 12   
  and solving (3) for mi yields   
(5)  mi,t = (ln IFi,t – ln [IFi,t – Li,t (gi,t/(1+gi))])/ln (1+gi,t) .   
By construction, equations (4) to (5) apply to cases in which growth rates, average maturities 
and repayment schedules remain constant over the entire observation period. However, as we 
will show in section IV, equation (4) provides fairly accurate estimations of gross inflows also 
in those cases, in which the three determinants vary across periods.
13 
Observation 5: Financing patterns differ from financing structures (as defined above) in a single 
year but the two can be reconciled for longer time periods.     
The role of a specific financing source is typically different in a given year depending on 
whether it is measured based on gross flow data or based on level data. The main reason for this 
discrepancy is of course closely connected to observation 4: Levels of long-term financial 
instruments are not only affected by financing activities that have been taking place during the 
current period but also by transactions from previous periods. As a consequence, the relative 
portion of nominal outstandings in total outstandings must over a sufficiently long observation 
period of n years be a function of the portion of gross flows from that very same source over 
total gross financing. In fact, because ratios are considered in both cases, growth rates in levels 
and  gross flows cancel out. The relationship between patterns and structures is therefore 
                                                             
12 Note that equation (4) simplifies to IFi,t = Li,t if mi equals 1 and to IFi,t = Li,t / mi as gi converges to zero. 
13 In order to limit possible distorting effects from changes in growth rates in our empirical study in section IV we use 
the average growth rate of levels over the previous mi,t periods as the value for gi,t. Given that in our dataset, average 
growth rates gi,t range between -1 and 25 percent, with a concentration around 5 to 11 percent, equation (4) will only 
slightly underestimate true gross inflows for a large spectrum of realistic repayment schedules (see footnote 11). 
Hence, the portions of gross flows from external financing that we report in section IV tend to be lower bound 
estimates.   10
exclusively determined by the long-term average maturities mi of the instruments. Normalizing 
gross flow portions by a standard maturity m* yields adjusted financing patterns that ought to 
be congruent with unadjusted financing structures from nominal outstandings over an n -year 
observation period. This is reflected in equation (6) in which the index j refers to the 
appropriate balance sheet items.   
(6)  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ =
t j
n
t
t , j t , i
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n
t
t , j t , i
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n
1
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n
1
* m
m
   
In section IV, we will apply equation (6) to check our empirical evidence on financing patterns 
and financing structures for consistency. Note that financial structures from level data can only 
be reconciled with financing patterns based on gross flows but not with financing patterns 
based on net flows. 
In summary, the general measurement concepts that have been presented in this section are 
complementary with respect to the questions that they help to answer. Net inflows indicate the 
change in importance of observed financing sources. Levels reveal long-term averages for the 
relative importance of liability items in financing assets and gross flows indicate the breakdown of 
funding of total investment in a given year. Some concepts are hence not well suited to answer 
particular questions. However, there have been prominent instances in the literature where exactly 
this has happened. 
 
III  Brief review of the related empirical literature 
In their widely cited article “What do we know about capital structure – some evidence from 
international data”, Rajan/Zingales (1995; hereafter RZ) approach the question of international 
differences in capital structure from several angles. They start out with an analysis of level data 
from 1991 company accounts obtained from the Global Vantage Database and find that “(i) the 
United Kingdom and Germany have the lowest leverage among the G-7 countries; and (ii) all 
other countries have approximately the same amount of leverage […]” (p. 1438). The numerous 
adjustments for m ajor differences in accounting practices that they carry out in their study and 
their utilization of alternative measures of leverage are in their opinion responsible for the fact that 
their empirical results deviate strongly from the results obtained by most prior studies.
14 
                                                             
14 Rutherford (1988) surveys prior work and concludes that German and Japanese firms are more highly leveraged 
than Anglo-Saxon firms.   11
The lack of unanimity in empirical results indicates that differences in accounting practices 
indeed pose a great problem for studies based on individual company accounts. Sample selection 
bias certainly is another important issue at least in the case of German firms. The Global Vantage 
database used by RZ only contains data on 191 listed German firms, most of which belong to the 
largest in the country. Data from Deutsche Bundesbank (1998) indicates that in 1991 bank debt 
over assets was around 10 percent for German firms with a turnover exceeding 100 million DM 
but more than 25 percent for the large number of German firms with sales below 100 million DM 
and almost 40 percent for the German firms that fall into the category with an annual turnover 
smaller than 5 million DM.
15 It is hence questionable whether the result of RZ that has been cited 
above, would remain valid if the German sample had been extended to smaller firms. 
Unanimity, however, seems to exist among empirical studies based on flow-of-funds data, be 
it in aggregate form as provided by central banks and the OECD, respectively, or be it in 
disaggregate, individual company format as provided for example by Global Vantage and 
Compustat. RZ report external net financing as a fraction of total financing, which must by 
definition equal total investment, for the G7 countries during 1984-1991. Based on their finding 
that, except for Japan, external financing was (much) less important then internal financing via 
cash flows from operations, RZ conclude that “there is no clear distinction between the Anglo-
Saxon economies and the others”. Mayer/Sussmann (2002) analyze Compustat data from more 
than 10.000 US companies for the 1988-1998 interval and obtain similar results to RZ. The 
fraction of internal funds in total financing is 77 percent on average. This is not only a support for 
the position advanced by RZ, but also for the findings of Corbett/Jenkinson (1996 and 1997). 
Following the lead of Mayer (1988), Corbett/Jenkinson (1997) conducted the most extensive 
study based on net flows from aggregate flow of funds data so far. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Table 3 is taken from their article and shows that, averaged over the 25 periods between 1970 
and 1994, internal funds dominate external funds strongly in all four countries. Surprisingly, bank 
finance seems to be less important in Germany than in the United Kingdom whereas new equity 
seems to more important in Germany and Japan than in both Anglo-Saxon economies. Similar 
                                                             
15 A recent publication by Deutsche Bundesbank (2002) shows that these values have remained nearly unchanged over 
the course of  the nineties.   12
tables can now be found in almost every textbook on corporate finance.
16 The view that internal 
funds dominate the financing of investment in most countries and that the patterns of external 
financing do not justify the conventional classification of economies into bank-based and market-
based ones is hence by now part of mainstream academic thinking.
17 Given the insights from the 
last section and the empirical results from measuring gross flows that are presented below, we 
believe that this view is not justified.  
In their study, Corbett/Jenkinson use net flows, and this in a double sense. Central banks and 
statistical offices present flow-of-funds data only after repayments have been netted out. For 
example, the figures for bank loan financing in any given year result from subtracting all loan 
repayments by the nonfinancial enterprise sector from the total volume of new bank loans taken 
out by firms from the sector during the same year. Similarly, equity financing is calculated as the 
difference between the proceeds from issuing new shares and the cash outflows for buying back 
shares from the public, including the acquisition of shares in other companies. One could call this 
form of netting "repayment netting". The second step of netting consists in eliminating firms’ 
financial investments. For instance, net flows between banks and non-financial companies are the 
difference between the volume of (net) financing of firms by banks, e.g. in the form of bank loans, 
and firms’ financial investments with banks, e.g. in the form of bank deposits. One could call this 
second type of netting "balance sheet netting". If we assume that all financial assets in our 
example in Table 1 are in the form of bank deposits and all liabilities are in the form of bank 
loans, balance sheet netting corresponds to subtracting the numbers in row “Liquid assets (Net 
                                                             
16 For instance, Brealey and Myers present extensive tables with net sources of financing on pp. 364-367 of the 5
th 
edition of their well-known textbook. With reference to the U.S., they write on p. 367: "The most striking aspect [of 
these tables] is the dominance of internally generated cash, defined as cash flow from operations less cash dividends 
paid to stockholders. Internally generated cash normally covers a majority of firm’s capital requirements." Page 324 
of their 4
th edition contains the additional comment: "Notice that the reliance on internally generated cash is the same 
the whole world over." Similar textbook presentations of net sources of financing include Arnold (1998), p. 351, and 
Pike and Neale (1996), p. 465 (both with special reference to the United Kingdom), Buckley et al. (1998) p. 354, 
Damodaran.(2001), p. 513. Damodaran (2001) presents results of an earlier version of this paper to highlight 
international differences in financing patterns. 
17 Explicit references to Mayer in the research literature include Allen (1993), Allen and Gale (2000), Conti (1992), 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Hellwig (1991, 1997), and Thakor (1996).   13
flows)” from the numbers in row “Debt (Net flows)”. The flows - thus netted twice - are then 
expressed by Corbett/Jenkinson as a fraction of total physical investment.
18 
Our simple example captures the essence of how flow-of-fund studies measure the " the 
relative significance of different sources of finance in physical investment" (Mayer and Alexander 
1990, p. 454). As can be seen from the last column in Table 2, “repayment netting” implies that, 
accumulated over the three periods, external net financing is zero. “Balance sheet netting” implies 
that net financing is zero for every single of the three years, because net flows from liabilities 
cancel out with net flows from liquid assets. Because we know by construction of our example 
that 16.7 percent of investment is financed by external sources, it seems fair to say that net flow 
approaches of determining  how investment is financed lead to a distorted picture of the reality 
which they aspire to capture, and that they might even suggest far-reaching, but misleading 
implications. Imagine that, based on the results for the model economy in our example, someone 
would conclude that there was no reason to have banks or any other source of external finance at 
all! This does, however, not imply that there would not be important questions to which studies 
based on (double) netting present important insights. They indeed show the relative  net 
contributions of different sources of finance over a given time interval and hence indicate the 
change in importance of different sources. 
As mentioned above, the main factor which produces the results of net-flow studies is the 
implicit assumption concerning how funds from each particular source are used: It is assumed that 
funds from bank loans are used in the first instance to pay back bank loans, while proceeds from 
the issue of new bonds or equity shares are first of all used to redeem or buy back bonds and 
shares, respectively - and this on a sector-wide level. Only what remains after these "primary" uses 
of funds is assumed to finance investment. The case of internal financing is the only one in which 
there is no corresponding "use of first resort", and this creates the impression that investment is 
almost exclusively financed internally (see observation 3 in section II). 
There are two general ways out of this dilemma. One way, which was recently explored by 
Mayer/Sussman (2002), is to analyze net flows for a specific subset of firms, namely for those 
                                                             
18 They define the ratio of the net financing ij from any one source j of financing - namely internal funds, banks, 
bonds, equity, trade credit, capital transfers, and others - to aggregate investment as the contribution of source j to the 
financing of total investment in a five-year period. The formula they use is St itj pt / St It qt , where It represents the 
total amount of gross investment in plant, machinery and other fixed assets and net additions to working capital in 
year t. The summation over t serves the purpose of aggregating over a certain number of periods in order to eliminate 
business cycle effects and other peculiarities of any given year. pt and qt are price indices.   14
firms that experience an investment spike. The idea behind the investment spike approach is 
straightforward: In the very period in which firms make heavy investments, financial gross 
inflows must substantially exceed financial gross outflows, which in turn depend on inflows from 
prior periods. If investment activity in these prior periods was very low compared to the spike 
period, the net flows of the spike period are indeed a good approximation of the respective gross 
flows. In the example of Table 1 the investment activity of all three firms was nil prior to their 
investment spike, so that in this special case net flows fully equal gross flows. If one omits those 
firm-years in which external funds are repaid  – which is exactly what the investment spike 
approach calls for - the aggregated fraction of net external funding in total investment must be 
positive. In our example it amounts to 25 percent. Because only spike years are considered, the 
financing of all investment activity in all other firm-years, which according to Mayer/Sussman can 
be assumed to be “associated with routine replacement rather than expansion of the capital stock” 
(p. 2) is not accounted for by this approach. Hence it does not answer the question “how is overall 
investment financed?” but answers the question “how are large investment projects financed?”. 
Because single firm-years with investment spikes have to be identified and extracted the 
measurement concept only works with data sources that provide single-company accounts. As a 
consequence, international comparisons have to deal with the problem of accounting differences 
and with a selection bias due to the dominance for some countries of firms of very large size. If, 
for example, firm A from our example presented above were not included in the sample, the 
portion of external funding in investment would drop to 12.5 percent.
19 
A second alternative to arrive at a better picture of how aggregate investment is financed is to 
analyze aggregated gross flows instead of aggregated net flows. This avoids the arbitrary 
assumptions concerning the allocation of sources to uses of funds altogether. Rather, it 
acknowledges the logical fact that all sources of funds are jointly employed for all uses of funds, 
and hence that all sources of funds also jointly provide the funding for physical investment. In the 
example from Table 1, the sum of physical and financial investments amounts to 35 units in each 
of the three periods on average (see last column). 5 units stem from external sources, another 5 
                                                             
19 Furthermore, the exclusive coverage of spike years in combination with repayment and balance sheet netting of 
“other instruments” that do not qualify either as long-term debt or equity typically results in a underestimation of the 
importance of internal funds. In our example, firm B finances 50 percent of its period-2 investment spike by means of 
internal funds, and 25 percent each by selling liquid assets and by taking on new liabilities. Since the liquid assets are 
nothing else then last year’s excess internal funds, the fraction of internal funds is only half the value that it would 
take on if the sample also included non-spike years.   15
units are financed by selling liquid assets and 25 units are financed by internal sources. Because 
the 5 units in liquid assets exclusively comprise internal sources from previous periods that are 
already accounted for by the 25 units, they can be omitted from the analysis. As a consequence, 
5/30 or roughly 17 percent of each dollar invested stems from external sources. The remaining 83 
percent are internally financed. 
In the next section we carry forward the concept of measuring gross-flow financing patterns 
from our simple numerical example to the enterprise sectors of the three largest economies in the 
world. After presenting the empirical results we will explain how the underlying gross flows were 
obtained or estimated, respectively. At the end of the section we will assess the accuracy  and 
consistency of the empirical results. 
 
IV  Measuring financing patterns on the basis of gross flows 
A  General approach and main empirical results 
Our general approach to measuring financing patterns is closely related to that of prior net flow 
studies but substitutes net flows by gross flows. In a first step, gross flow time series are either 
directly retrieved from accessible data sources or, if no original data is available, they are 
estimated from available data on levels and average maturities (see next subsection). In a second 
step, annual gross flows from the various financial instruments that exist in each country are 
grouped into common categories that can be more easily compared internationally, i.e. long-term 
loans from banks and other financial intermediaries, equity instruments, bonds and all short-term 
debt. In a third step, aggregated gross flows from the same category are divided by total physical 
investment of the respective enterprise sector. These ratios are then compared to internal funds 
over investment in order to determine the relative importance of internal and external funds in 
financing physical investment. One could of course also divide gross flows from each long-term 
category by total gross flows from all internal and all long-term external financing sources to 
derive the categories’ portions in total financing. Because long-term asset tend to be financed with 
long-term liabilities (see e.g. Hart/Moore 1994) total long-term financing should roughly equal 
total long-term investments and portions in long-term total financing should hence be identical to 
the portions in long-term total investment. For the sake of comparability of our results to those of 
prior net-flow studies, we have decided to express financing gross flows in terms of total physical   16
investment.
20 Irrespective of the denominator in step 3, one can in a fourth step compute the 
portions of long-term external financing sources in total external gross financing to analyze 
financial patterns in more depth.  
Table 4 shows our results for step 3. It compares the average portion of external long-term 
financing over physical investment to the average portions of two standard forms of internal funds 
for Japanese, German and US firms. Averaged over the years 1970 to 2000, the volume of total 
internal funds ranges from 77 percent (Japan) to 87 percent (USA) of total physical investment. 
Internal funds mainly consist of cash flows that are designated as depreciation expenses and to a 
much lesser extent of internal funds that arise from retaining profits. The average portion of long-
term external funds differs more strongly between the three countries: Whereas German and 
American firms obtained 66 cent and 74 cent, respectively, in long-tem external funds for every 
dollar they generated internally, Japanese firms obtained a remarkable 188 cents from external 
long-term sources. Although internal funds are hence a very important source of finance they are 
not the most important source in all countries. This evidence stands in stark contrast to a central 
result of those studies that have used net flows to examine financing patterns, namely that internal 
financing strongly dominates external net financing in all analyzed countries.
21 
Insert Table 4 here 
Table 4 contains three additional rows  that aim to capture the role of short-term financial 
sources, namely gross flows from short-term debt, net flows from short-term debt and net flows 
from short-term debt minus net flows from short-term financial investment (“double netting”) as a 
percentage of investment, respectively. Following Baker/Wurgler (2000) we approximate gross 
flows from short-term instruments by taking the corresponding year-end levels, thereby assuming 
that these instruments have an average maturity of exactly one year. Because the term to maturity 
of most short-term instruments is indeed even lower, outstandings are only very conservative 
                                                             
20 Given the figures on internal and external gross flows over physical investment in Table 4 and given the breakdown 
of total external funds in Figure 5, one can easily derive the breakdown of total long-term financing/investment. 
21 It is worth noting, that there also exists an opposite effect which applies to both net flow and gross flow studies and 
which leads to a slight underestimation of the role of internal funds vis à vis the role of external funds. This effect is 
due to the fact that most expenses on research and development activities have to be expensed by firms against their 
earnings, thereby reducing retained earnings and hence reported internal funds. If R&D expenses were treated as 
investments – what they arguably are - the portion of internal funds in total investments would increase and the 
portion of other financing sources would decrease.   17
estimates for gross flows from instruments with shorter maturities.
22 However, even these lower-
bound estimates indicate that the inclusion of short-term gross flows would swamp our empirical 
results on aggregate financial patterns. Rather, short-term flows are an exception for which the use 
of net flows to measure financing patterns might make more sense than the use of gross flows. As 
can be safely assumed, most short-term instruments like commercial paper, short term bank loans 
and trade credits mainly serve working capital purposes like payroll needs, inventory management 
and liquidity management for smoothing out seasonal imbalances and much less the purpose of 
financing long-term investment. Hence, it seems justified to only look at the marginal contribution 
of the liability side of liquidity management to long-term financing. This is equivalent to looking 
at annual net flows from short-term l iabilities. In order to account for the fact that liquidity 
management does not only involve short-term liabilities but also short term financial claims like 
cash, bank deposits and trade receivables, one should apply double netting to short-term liabilities 
and assets and use the resulting net flows as indicators for the role of short-term instruments.
23 The 
lower part of Table 4 above reports both variants of net figures and also one gross figure and 
indicates that the contribution of total double-netted f lows from liquidity management activities 
are indeed negligible. 
Insert Table 5 here 
For an analysis of the relative importance of different external sources we broke down the total 
portion of external funds into the gross flow contribution of various instruments in Table 5. Note 
that the figures are percentages of total external long-term funding and thus add up to 100. 
Presenting the instrumental breakdown as percentages of total physical investment, as in the 
previous table, or as percentages of total physical and financial investment, would not alter the 
conclusions, but make them less obvious. Bank loans are by far the most important source of long-
                                                             
22 For example, Light/White (1979) find an average maturity of just 35 days for commercial paper issued by US firms 
in their sample. According to data provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank for the years 1991 to 2000, the average 
volume of gross inflows into the German nonbank sector from the issuance of commercial paper was roughly 100 
billion DM per year and thereby almost half as high as inflows from all long-term loans taken out by German firms. 
However, most commercial paper was repaid in the very same year so that average outstandings were less than 10 
billion during the ten years, which is only a small fraction of the roughly 1,200 billion in average outstandings of 
long-term loans. 
23 RZ neglect trade credit when computing their measures for financial leverage because short term assets and 
liabilities may jointly be influenced by industry considerations and not financing decisions.   18
term external funds in both Germany and Japan.
24 Their shares are more than four times as high as 
for US firms. This relation is reversed in the case of loans from other financial institutions. 
Between 1970 and 2000, more than 50 percent of the US mortgage loan market was in the hands 
of non banks like life insurance companies and public financial institutions and almost 90 percent 
of other loans and advances were provided by non-banks such as finance companies and by 
foreign financial institutions. Another sharp contrast exists with regards to the amounts raised 
through the issuance of bonds. Roughly a third of total US external funds comes from this source, 
whereas bond finance accounts for less than 10 percent of total external funds in Germany and 
Japan. Although new equity finance is the least important source in all three countries its share is 
clearly higher in the US than in the other two countries. The total share of securities, or organized 
capital markets, as a source of financing was hence much higher in the US than in Germany and 
Japan. Because US nonbank financial institutions are more important investors on these organized 
capital markets than US banks the importance of capital markets translates into an even greater 
dominance of nonbank financial institutions over banks than indicated by the figures for long-term 
loans alone. Assuming that the shares in bonds and equity shares outstandings, which are both 
readily available from National Account Statistics, provide a good approximation for the 
respective shares in purchases of newly issued equities, we are able to estimate the total portions 
of US banks and US non-bank financial institutions in US firms’ external long-term gross 
financing. For the period 1970-2000 we obtain an average portion of 22 percent for banks and an 
average portion of 64 percent for nonbanks financial institutions. 
Table 6 subdivides the entire time span covered so far and shows that financing patterns have 
not converged over the course of the last  thirty years. Rather, differences have become more 
pronounced. The share of US bank loans dropped by more than a third whereas bank loans in 
Germany and Japan have only moderately lost ground. During the same period, the share of newly 
issued securities has increased from 36 percent to 53 percent for US corporations whereas it grew 
from 14 percent to 18 percent in Germany and from 14 percent to 17 percent in Japan. As a 
consequence the gap between the amount of public financing (stocks and bonds) in the US and the 
                                                             
24 The share of bank loans in German firms’ external financing would increase to above 80 percent if a broader 
definition of the non-financial company sector was chosen. Until 1998 the Deutsche Bundesbank published the flow-
of-funds accounts for the housing sector and the “production company” sector separately. Throughout this paper, we 
apply the narrow definition, although the housing sector comprises to an unknown part of financing activities of 
companies that are part of the non-financial sector in the other two countries.   19
amount of private financing (bank loans) in Germany and Japan has widened.
25 
Insert Table 6 here 
In summary, there are significant differences between financing patterns in the three financial 
systems which the measurement of gross flows brings out clearly, and these differences are 
characterized by a surprising stability over time. Contrary to the results of studies based on net 
flows, the presented evidence from gross flows is completely in line with generally held beliefs 
that banks are the most important external source of financing in Germany and Japan, whereas 
capital markets and non-bank financial intermediaries are of greater importance in the US. 
B  How to obtain times series on gross flows 
Unlike levels and net flows, gross flows from external sources are typically not reported in 
National Account Statistics. Data for most tradable instruments, however, can be found in other 
publications of central banks and statistical offices or can be acquired from commercial vendors of 
financial data. From these very sources, we were able to obtain actual annual gross flows for all 
equity instruments and all domestic bonds issued by German, Japanese and US non-financial 
companies and for all marketable foreign debt issued by US firms for the years 1970 to 2000. 
Figure A1 in the Appendix presents true gross inflows from the issuance of equity instruments 
as a percentage of annual physical investment. Data sources are reported in the comments to 
Figure A1. As expected, Japanese figures for equity issuances exceed US and German figures for 
most of the seventies and eighties but have dropped sharply after the crash in stock and real estate 
markets in 1990. The German graph reflects the IPO of the Deutsche Telekom in 1996 and the 
initial success of the Neuer Markt, which was launched in 1998 (and shut down in 2003). 
Figure A2 in the Appendix presents gross flows from the issuance of long-term marketable debt 
as a percentage of investment, including the proceeds from, inter alia, straight bonds, convertible 
bonds and medium term notes. US firms were far more active in bond issuances than their German 
peers. Japanese firms took on a middle position during most of the thirty-year interval and have 
even surpassed US firms in the late nineties. Whereas we were able to acquire actual data on both 
levels and gross flows in the case of domestic bonds, we could find only level data in the case of 
corporate foreign debt. In estimating the corresponding gross flows we used equation (4) from 
section II, which itself encapsulates one main observation from our simple numerical example: 
                                                             
25 RZ conclude from their evidence that it is precisely the different roles played by public and private financing that 
distinguishes bank oriented countries from market oriented countries.   20
Gross inflows for a given year can be approximated by a function that contains as variables the 
amount of outstandings in the same instrument at year-end, the annual growth rate in these 
outstandings and the average maturity of the instrument in question. Therefore, with time series on 
actual levels at hand, all that is needed is information on average terms to maturity of foreign 
bonds. Given that the proceeds from domestic and external bonds are used to finance similar types 
of assets, we assumed that the average terms to maturities of both types of bonds coincide. Terms 
to maturity of domestic bonds can in turn be inferred from available actual gross flows in two 
ways. Firstly, one can directly enter gross flows and level data into equation (4) from section II. 
However, if annual growth rates of levels develop quite erratically - as was for example the case 
for the narrow German domestic corporate bond market over much of the 1980s – implied average 
maturities show an unreasonably high variance. The second alternative to derive average 
maturities does not require level growth rates but builds primarily upon actual gross flows and 
thereby avoids large variances in implied terms to maturity. In a first step, two new time series are 
constructed, namely cumulative gross inflows from the issuance of domestic bonds and 
cumulative gross o utflows from redeeming bonds plus any defaults.
26 In a second step, we 
counted, for each period t, the number of periods m t it took until cumulative outflows had reached 
the level of cumulative inflows from period t. In essence, we thereby measure the average time 
span that elapsed between the period in which new debt had been taken on by firms and the period 
in which an equal amount was repaid, and written off by creditors, respectively. Counting lags 
should hence give us a fairly good, albeit slightly upward biased
27, proxy for the average number 
of periods the enterprise sector needed to redeem its bonds, or in other words: for the average 
maturity of this financing instrument. 
Data on true gross flows from taking out new long-term loans were only available for one 
specific type of loans to Japanese firms, namely for bank loans for equipment funds. Gross flows 
for all other long-term loans from banks and other financial institutions in all three countries had 
thus to be estimated. We followed the same approach as in the case of foreign bonds, i.e. we 
entered data on levels, on moving averages of level growth rates and on average maturities into 
equation (4). Data on actual levels could once again be directly drawn from the relevant data 
                                                             
26 In most instances in which we applied this method of counting lags, we chose 1970 as the starting period. In order 
to account for the debt, that was already outstanding at this time, we used the sum of outstandings at end 1969 and 
gross inflows during 1970 as the starting value for cumulative inflows.    21
sources. In further analogy to the case of foreign bonds, average maturities were approximated by 
other available information in combination with only a few simple assumptions: In the case of 
other loans to Japanese firms, we assumed that their average maturity is identical to that of loans 
for Japanese equipment funds as implied by the number of lags between cumulative gross 
outflows and cumulative gross inflows. For long-term loans to German firms we used the banking 
statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank, which group all outstanding long-term bank loans into two 
distinct maturity bands. In assuming an average maturity of 2.5 years for all loans in the first band 
(1-4 years) and an average maturity of 7 years for all loans in the second band (>4 years) we were 
able to construct a times series on average maturities of bank loans. Loans from German insurance 
companies were assumed to have the same maturity as bank loans. For mortgage loans to US firms 
we used average maturities of mortgage bonds as reported in Guedes/Opler (1996).  Because 
roughly two thirds of all other long-term loans to US firms were granted by non-bank financial 
institutions like finance companies we used the average maturity of auto loans as a proxy for all 
loans in this category. 
Figure A3 in the Appendix shows the estimated gross flows aggregated over bank and non 
bank loans as a percentage of investment for the three enterprise sectors. Both US and German 
figures are fairly stable and much lower than Japanese figures. The latter grew from below 100 
percent in the early seventies to over 150 percent in the late nineties. The comments to Figure A3 
provide additional details on data sources and assumptions. 
C  Accuracy and consistency of our measurement concept 
Two data series from the Japanese Statistical Office provide a unique opportunity to test the 
accuracy of our measurement approach. In particular, the series put us into a position to assess the 
applicability of equations (4) and (5) for situations in which levels do not grow at a constant 
growth rate over the entire observation period and in which the exact forms of repayment 
schedules are not known. The Japanese dataset contains quarterly outstandings as well as quarterly 
gross inflows of a specific type of bank loans to Japanese non-financial firms, namely loans for 
equipment funds. Over the 1970-2000 interval, loans belonging to this category accounted on 
average for about two-thirds of total long-term loans to Japanese firms. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
27 Even if cumulative outflows in period t+m are only one dollar smaller than cumulative inflows in period t, the 
method yields an average maturity of m+1 periods for those inflows. On average, counting lags should hence 
overestimate average maturities by about 0.5 periods.   22
Insert Figure 1 here 
The solid black line in Figure 1 shows the quarterly volume of new loans for equipment funds 
taken out by Japanese non-financial firms. The dotted line shows the corresponding quarterly net 
flows that result from subtracting gross outflows due to repayments and defaults from gross 
inflows. It is apparent that in times during which the volume of new loans is increasing, the 
volume of outflows lags the volume of inflows and as a consequence net inflows are positive. In 
periods during which the volume of new loans is declining, repayments exceed gross inflows and 
net f lows turn negative. As conjectured in observation 2, made in section II B, net flows show 
growth patterns of outstandings rather than the overall importance of the financing source in 
question. 
A straightforward way to assess the accuracy of estimates of gross loans based on equation (4) 
is to compare our estimation results applied to the net figures with the true gross flows reported in 
the Japanese dataset. For that purpose we used true end-period level figures Li,t, moving averages 
of level growth rates gi,t and average maturities m i,t of i=”loans for equipment funds”. Because 
average maturities are not reported in the Japanese dataset, we approximated them by counting the 
number of periods until true accumulated outflows catch up with true accumulated inflows. Figure 
2 below shows the resulting estimates for maturities m i,t in quarters. Also shown in Figure 2 are 
implied average maturities that result from entering original data into equation (4). The average 
maturities for the entire period from 1971-2001 that result from the two methods are 14.3 and 13.9 
quarters, respectively.
28 
Insert Figure 2 here 
The bold gray line in Figure 1 shows estimated gross inflows when the number of lags is used 
as a proxy for the average maturity m i,t.
29 Estimated inflows deviate notably from true inflows in 
periods in which true inflows move erratically, as was the case e.g. in the aftermath of the burst of 
Japanese equity and real estate price bubble in the early nineties. Over the entire time window, 
however, our estimates provide a very good approximation for true volumes: the estimated total 
volume of new equipment loans granted to Japanese firms is only 2 percent smaller than the true 
total volume (over 915 trillion yen) over the 30 years in question. The deviation changes slightly 
                                                             
28 The method of counting lags yields slightly larger estimates primarily because of its crudeness (see previous 
footnote). We abstained from extrapolation for the sake of simplicity but have subtracted 0.4 quarters from all average 
maturities that were used to estimate the gross flows in Figure 1. 
29 If maturities implied by equation (5) were used the gray line would be identical to the black line in Figure 1.   23
to 0.5 percent if mi,t is set to a constant value of mi=13.9 for all periods. Using greater and smaller 
constant values for m i indicates that overestimating average maturities distorts estimates of gross 
flows less than underestimating: If m i is set to 19 quarters, total inflows are 24 percent too low, 
whereas they turn out to be 50 percent too high if m is set to 9 quarters. The results imply that if 
direct information or reliable estimates on the average maturities are available, equation (4) allows 
for a fairly accurate estimation of gross flow volumes over a longer period of time. Estimates are 
biased if growth rates of outstandings are very erratic or if wrong values for average maturities are 
used and especially if these values are set far too low compared to true average maturities. 
In order to check our financing patterns from gross flows for consistency, we examined 
whether the evidence presented in Tables 4-6 can be reconciled with financing structures reported 
in empirical studies that u se aggregated level data on firms’ liabilities from Flow-of-Funds 
Statistics (see e.g. Schmidt et al 1999 and Hackethal 2001). For that purpose we calculated 
average financing structures and  adjusted  average financing patterns for the three countries 
between 1970 and 2000. Financing structures indicate the average share of a financing source or a 
group of financing sources, respectively, in the total nominal value of all outstanding liabilities 
and equity. Adjusted financing patterns are based on gross flows, which were standardized by a 
uniform maturity to account for the differences in average maturities of the various instruments 
(see Table 7) and for the fact that levels are a linear function of the volume of gross flows and 
their average maturities (see equation (6) in observation 5). 
Comparing the two columns for each country shows that slight deviations only occur in the 
case of bonds and short-term financing.
30 Overall, however, the exercise shows that the results of 
the measurement concept which we have presented here are clearly in line with the evidence on 
financing structures. 
 
V  Conclusion and suggestions for further research 
In this paper we have developed and applied a new methodology of using flow of funds data to 
empirically assess the possible existence of differences between the financing patterns in the 
world’s three largest economies. The new methodology employs gross flows of funds from 
different financial sources to non-financial firms, and in so far differs from the established 
                                                             
30 This might indicate that our assumption concerning a flat one-year maturity for all short-term instruments might be 
too crude and that our estimates for the average maturities of bonds might be biased upwards over the entire 30-year 
period.   24
methodology which uses net flows of funds. The difficulty which our approach had to overcome is 
that not all gross flows are readily available in accessible data bases and therefore some gross 
flows have to be estimated. We developed an estimation procedure to overcome this difficulty, 
applied it to empirical data, and also showed that it is robust.  
The comparisons of stocks of inter-sectoral financial claims and of gross flows of funds 
between sectors show that the financing patterns in the three large economies discussed in this 
paper differ substantially. The analysis of gross flows of funds provides a different answer to the 
important question of “ how is investment financed” in different financial systems, asked by 
Corbett and Jenkinson (1997), than studies using net flows of funds. We tend to think that this 
answer is more in line with what researchers and policy makers would want to know about 
financing patterns. Our results suggest that it makes sense to speak of different national financing 
patterns. The "celebrated distinction between the market-based financial patterns of ... the United 
States and of the bank-based patterns of Germany is not "inaccurate", as Corbett and Jenkinson 
concluded in their article. 
To conclude the paper, we would like to briefly put the result of this paper in a broader context 
and to point out areas for further research. From an economic standpoint, financing patterns 
prevailing in a given country are an essential element of the financial system of this country; and 
differences in financial patterns which are consistent with other differences between the elements 
of the financial system elements of different countries suggest that it makes sense to speak of 
financial systems as coherent configurations of complementary elements. Indeed, the differences 
between the financing patterns of the three countries covered in this study are largely consistent 
with differences between the financial sector structure and the corporate governance regimes and 
several other financial system elements in these countries. As we have shown in another paper,
31 
the issue of complementarity and consistency of financial systems is important for the questions of 
change and modernization of financial systems and of a possible convergence of financial systems.   
The results of our paper point to a number of very interesting research opportunities. First and 
foremost, it would be interesting to see similar analyses of financial patterns of other countries 
emerge. Since our study covers countries for which one can assume that the basic characteristics 
of their financial systems are largely stable, we would particularly recommend to investigate how 
                                                             
31 See Schmidt et al. (2002), where references to related studies covering other elements of financial systems and 
issues of financial systems development are provided.    25
financial patterns develop in countries, such as France, in which the character of the financial 
system has undergone a massive transformation in the course of the last 20 years. It would be 
equally fascinating to learn more about the way in which non-financial firms finance their 
investments in countries like the Netherlands whose financial systems cannot as easily as the U.S., 
Japan and Germany be classified as being either bank-based or capital market based.  
Another implication for further research refers to the broader context and to the methodology of 
comparative work on financial systems. The results reported in this paper suggest that it is indeed 
promising to continue this line of research not only on a mainly theoretical level, as in the book by 
Allen and Gale (2000) and their related papers (e.g. Allen and Gale 2001), but also at the empirical 
level. This research strategy seems to require the development of relatively sophisticated 
measurement methods as well as country studies which investigate in depth how the various 
elements of a given financial system interact and mutually determine each other.      26
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Table 1 
Illustration of alternative measurement concepts 
In the table, financing patterns are derived for a model economy with three firms. Panel A shows annual financial 
flows, annual financial flows as a percentage of investment and year-end levels on a firm-level. Panel B shows the 
corresponding sector aggregates for each of the three periods as well as averaged over all three periods. 
 
        Panel A     Panel B 
        Firm A     Firm B     Firm C     All firms 
Period  1  2  3    1  2  3    1  2  3    1  2  3  ˘ 1-3 
                                      
Investment  -20  -5  -5    -5  -20  -5    -5  -5  -20    -30  -30  -30  -30 
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Table 2 
The role of external financing according to different measurement approaches 
The ratios indicate the role of external financing in the model economy from Table 1 based on different measurement 
concepts. Columns two and three refer to panel A in Table 1 and column four refers to panel B. Leverage is defined as 
debt levels over the sum of debt and equity levels. External gross inflows and external net flows are defined as gross 
flows from taking on new debt over investment and net flows from taking on and repaying debt over investment, 
respectively. Internal funds are also expressed as a fraction of investment. Averages for all ratios based on flow 
figures are weighted by the respective investment volume. The “spike” column shows weighted averages of the four 
ratios for the three company years in which investment amounts to 20 (Mayer/Sussman (2002) use exactly this 
approach to analyze financing patterns). The next column shows ratio averages for all nine company years. The last 
column is based on aggregate sector data and hence corresponds to the very last column of Table 1. 
 
   Company accounts (weighted averages)  Sector accounts 
   Spike years  All years    
Gross inflows from liabilities  25.0%  16.7%  16.7% 
Net inflows from liabilities  25.0%  0%  0% 
Leverage (unweighted)  38.9%  18.5%  26.7% 
Memo:       
Internal funds (gross = net)  50%  100%  100% 
 
 
Table 3 
Net sources of finance as a percentage of physical investment (1970-1994) 
 
Net Source of Finance  Germany  Japan  United Kingdom  United States 
Internal  78.9  69.9  93.3  96.1 
Bank finance  11.9  26.7  14.6  11.1 
Bonds  -1.0  4.0  4.2  15.4 
New Equity  0.1  3.5  -4.6  -7.6 
Trade Credit  -1.2  -5.0  -0.9  -2.4 
Capital Transfers  8.7  -  1.7  - 
Other  1.4  1.0  0.0  -4.4 
Statistical adjustment  1.2  0.0  -8.4  -8.3 
Source: Corbett/Jenkinson (1997)   30
Table 4 
Gross flows from internal and external sources as a percentage of physical investment (1970-2000) 
The table shows the unweighted averages of annual gross flows from different financing sources as a percentage of 
annual physical investment. Internal fund figures were directly taken from the German and the US Flow-of-Account 
Statistics and from the financial statements statistics of corporations that is provided by the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance. For the US depreciation and capital transfers include inventory valuation adjustments. If net flows into 
pension provisions are included for German firms. the portion of total internal funds increases to 88 percent. Gross 
long-term external funds are broken down in Table 5. Short-term funds comprise of debt instruments from financial 
institutions with maturities shorter than one year. trade payables and commercial paper. For net flows annual changes 
in the levels of the corresponding liability items have been used. Double netting figures result from subtracting 
liability net flows from net flows in the corresponding asset items. Based on the assumption that all short term funds 
have an average maturity of one year aggregated levels of short-term liabilities were used as a proxy for short-term 
gross flows. Therefore the numbers in the last row must be viewed as the lower bound for the true share of gross 
short-term funds in physical investment. 
 
   Germany  Japan  United States 
Retained earnings  3%  20%  13% 
Depreciation and capital transfers  80%  57%  74% 
Total internal funds  83%  77%  87% 
Total long-term external funds (gross)  55%  144%  64% 
   Memo:       
   Total short-term external funds (gross)  168%  768%  240% 
   Total short-term external funds (net)  11%  49%  18% 
   Total short-term external funds (double netting)  -5%  -7%  -1% 
 
Table 5 
Composition of external financing (1970-2000) 
Figures are unweighted averages of annual shares of single instruments in total gross flows and add up to 100 percent 
(neglecting rounding errors). Long-term loans comprise all loans from financial institutions with a term to maturity 
exceeding one year. In contrast to the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan which both distinguish explicitly 
between loans from banks and other financial institutions the Federal Reserve does not report the sectoral breakdown 
for long-term debt instruments of the nonfinancial business sector (L.101). We used the corresponding instrument 
tables L.216-L.221 of the US Flow of Fund Accounts which show overall market shares of creditor sectors in the 
market for mortgages and other loans and advances to derive the portions granted by banks (48 percent of mortgages 
and 10 percent of other loans and advances) and other financial institutions. respectively. Underlying annual gross 
flows from the issuance of bonds and new equity are the same as in Figures A1 and A2. respectively. 
 
   Germany  Japan  United States 
Long-term bank loans  76%  78%  18% 
Long-term loans from other financial institutions  10%  8%  38% 
Bonds  7%  9%  32% 
Equity  8%  5%  11% 
   31
Table 6 
Portions of long-term external sources in total long-term external gross flows 
This table is similar in construct to Table 5 but shows 5-year unweighted averages (6-year average for the most recent 
period) of annual shares in total external financing for each of four different external sources. Neglecting rounding 
errors. the figures add up to 100 percent for each country and each 5-year period. 
 
      70-74  75-79  80-84  85-89  90-94  95-00 
Japan             
Long-term bank loans  79%  79%  79%  75%  81%  74% 
Long-term loans from other financial institutions  8%  9%  8%  7%  8%  9% 
Bonds  7%  8%  6%  11%  9%  15% 
Equity  7%  5%  6%  6%  2%  2% 
  Memo:              
  Internal funds as a portion of investment  52%  76%  72%  81%  72%  98% 
               
Germany             
Long-term bank loans  75%  74%  77%  72%  76%  74% 
Long-term loans from other financial institutions  12%  11%  10%  10%  7%  8% 
Bonds  7%  7%  5%  9%  9%  8% 
Equity  7%  7%  7%  9%  8%  10% 
  Memo:              
  Internal funds as a portion of investment  71%  87%  83%  92%  83%  83% 
               
United States             
Long-term bank loans  22%  21%  21%  20%  11%  14% 
Long-term loans from other financial institutions  42%  45%  47%  35%  31%  34% 
Bonds  27%  28%  22%  38%  45%  34% 
Equity  9%  6%  9%  7%  13%  19% 
  Memo:              
   Internal funds as a portion of investment  72%  83%  84%  92%  99%  90% 
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Table 7 
Average years to maturity of debt instruments (1970-2000) 
The table shows average maturities of debt instruments as they are used throughout this paper. For the sake of 
simplicity we followed Baker/Wurgler (2000) in assuming that all short-term debt instruments like short-term bank 
loans. trade credit or commercial paper have a one-year average maturity. This assumption only affects the row “total 
short-term external funds (gross)” in Table 4 but none of our main results. Average terms to maturity for bonds in all 
three countries and for long-term loans in Japan were derived by counting lags between cumulated actual gross 
inflows and cumulated actual gross outflows. The resulting figure for bonds issued by US firms is close to the mean 
maturity of 12.2 years that was found by Guedes/Opler (1996. Table III) for their sample of 7.369 debt issues of US 
firms between 1982 and 1993. Average maturities for loans to German und US firms were derived from data provided 
by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve. respectively (refer to Figure A3 for further details). According 
to data from the US Flows of Funds Statistics 48 percent of mortgage loans and 10 percent of other loans and 
advances were granted by banks during our observation period. with the remainder stemming from domestic and 
foreign non bank financial institutions. We used these portions to translate average maturities for mortgage loans (12 
years) and average maturities of other loans and advances (5 years) into average maturities of loans from banks and 
loans from other financial institutions. The implied average maturity of all long-term debt of US firms is 9.9 years. 
which almost coincides with the estimate of 10 years that Baker et al. (2002) use in their study. 
  Germany  Japan  United States 
Short-term debt  1  1  1 
Long-term bank loans  11.1 
Long-term loans from other financial institutions 
6.1  3.4 
8.2 
Bonds  7.1  8.1  11.7 
 
Table 8 
Reconciliation of financing structures and financing patterns (1970-2000) 
Columns denoted by “Levels” break down total liabilities of non-financial company sectors in Germany. Japan and 
the US. Items such as tax payables. pension provisions and other miscellaneous liabilities have been omitted to 
improve comparability. Equity is at nominal value to avoid distorting valuation effects. Equity levels at nominal value 
are only available for the Japanese company sector. The German and US time series were obtained by cumulating 
(nominal) net flows from equity issuances. equity retirements and retained earnings. Doing the same with Japanese 
data yields a times series that traces nominal levels fairly close (average deviation is less than 2 percent). Columns 
denoted by “Adj. flows” show the breakdown of maturity-adjusted external gross flows. Because average maturities of 
equity instruments are unknown equity portions from the “level” columns were used. The portions for all other 
external sources were obtained by standardizing the corresponding figures in Tables 4 and 5 with a standard maturity. 
i.e. by multiplying the share in total gross financing by the respective average maturity from Table 6 and dividing it by 
the stipulated standard maturity. By taking the equity portion as given we have implicitly chosen the implicit average 
maturity of equity as the standard maturity. The alternative use of the average duration of asset lives for the standard 
maturity (Guedes/Opler 1996) report an average asset life of 8 years for US firms) or of any other number would not 
change the relation between portions of non-equity sources. Figures in columns add up to 100 percent (neglecting 
rounding errors). 
  Germany    Japan    United States 
   Levels  Adj. flows    Levels  Adj. flows   Levels  Adj. flows 
Short-term debt  27%  25%    49%  46%    27%  24% 
Long-term bank loans  37%  38%    22%  23%    10%  11% 
Long-term loans from other financial institutions  5%  5%    2%  2%    16%  16% 
Bonds  3%  4%    5%  7%    18%  20% 
Equity (nominal value)  28%     22%     29% 
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Figure 1 
Gross and net flows from loans for equipment funds to Japanese firms (1970-2000) 
The figure shows true quarterly gross inflows (black line) and true net flows (dotted line) from new industrial loans 
taken out by Japanese firms and compares them to estimated gross flows (gray line) as implied by equation (4). As 
inputs for equation (4) we used time series on true levels and average maturities as implied by counting lags between 
times series on accumulated gross inflows and outflows (see Figure 2 below). True gross flows. net flows and level 
data were taken from tables 13-19 and 13-24 of the Japanese Statistical Yearbook. The dimension of the vertical axis 
is 100 million yen. 
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Figure 2 
Implied average maturities (in quarters of a year) of Japanese loans for equipment funds (1971-2001) 
The dotted line indicates average maturities of loans for equipment funds as implied by entering true gross flows and 
true level data into equation (5). The gray line results from counting the number of quarters until cumulative loan 
repayments catch up with cumulative inflows from new loans and hence plots estimated average maturities. Data 
sources are the same as for Figure 1. Because the method of counting lags stops to produce values after III/1997 we 
assumed that average maturities for the last 17 quarters are equal to the last implied value (17). 
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Figure A1 
Gross flows from the issuance of new equity as a percentage of physical investment 
The figure shows gross flows from the issuance of new equity as a percentage of total capital expenditures of private 
non-financial companies in Germany. Japan and the U.S. For Japanese and German companies. we used net flow 
figures from National Accounts Statistics because the reported net flows are almost identical to actual gross flows 
from other publications. which. however. cover only part of our entire observation period. The series “Supply of 
Industrial Funds” (11-18) from the Japanese Statistical Yearbook provides true gross flows from equity instruments 
only for the years 1960 to 1984. Accumulated amounts raised through the issuance of new equity as reported in the 
yearbook exactly match accumulated amounts raised as indicated by the net flows from the National Accounts. 
Likewise. net flows reported in the German flow-of-funds statistics actually correspond to data on the issuances of 
new equity by domestic non-financial corporations which are provided by the Bundesbank through its capital market 
statistics. Only the 1998-figure had to be adjusted for the distorting effect of the Daimler-Chrysler merger. In contrast 
to the Japanese and German authorities. the Federal Reserve reports flows from equity instruments on a true net basis. 
that is after subtracting equity retirements due to share repurchases and cash financed mergers. Between 1995 and 
2000 alone. $819 billion in outstanding equity was retired by US corporations. implying negative net flows for all six 
years. For US firms. amounts raised through equity issuances were hence obtained from Security Data Corporation’s 
Platinum database. which reports all US transactions on a deal-by-deal basis. For all three countries. proprietors’ 
investments into non-corporate businesses were not included because of differences in compilation methods across 
countries and missing data for earlier years. 
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Figure A2 
Gross flows from the issuance of bonds as a percentage of physical investment 
The figure shows gross flows from the issuance of domestic and external bonds as a percentage of total capital 
expenditures of private non-financial companies in Germany. Japan and the U.S. Gross issuances of domestic 
industrial and convertible bonds by Japanese companies were directly taken from the Japanese Statistical Yearbook 
(11-23). Annual amounts raised through external bonds had to be estimated by entering level and maturity data into 
equation (4). Levels are reported in the Japanese National Accounts (external bonds accounted on average for 19 
percent of total bonds outstanding between 1970 and 2000). To obtain average maturities we assumed that external 
bonds have the same average maturity as domestic bonds for a given year. Average maturities for domestic bonds 
were derived by counting lags between cumulative gross inflows and cumulative gross outflows from domestic bonds 
(see section IV B). The Deutsche Bundesbank reports in its capital market statistics annual gross flows from the 
issuance of domestic corporate bonds as well as annual gross flows from all international issuances underwritten by 
consortia that were led by German financial institutions. The portion of international issuances that pertained to 
German non-financial companies and their foreign subsidiaries is not reported. Corresponding gross flows were hence 
again estimated by applying equation (4). Level data was obtained by subtracting the volume of outstanding domestic 
corporate bonds as reported in the capital market statistics from the total level of long-term marketable debt as 
reported in the German National Account Statistics for the same year. Average maturities were derived by counting 
lags between the two cumulative gross flow time series from all international issuances. We thereby assumed that 
average maturities of bonds of German corporations coincide with average maturities of international debt issued by 
other debtors.  Data on a nnual long-term debt issuances by US corporations were obtained from Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) and from various issues of the Bulletin of the Federal Reserve. series 1.45. Because coverage of 
the SDC database was apparently not exhaustive in the earlier years. we used Federal Reserve data until 1981. For the 
subsequent years we used SDC figures which cover external debt and medium term notes and exceeded Federal 
Reserve figures considerably in some years. Gross flows from industrial revenue bonds (municipal securities issued 
by state and local governments to finance private investment and secured by the industrial user of funds) were not 
available from either of the two data sources and hence had to be estimated by means of equation (4). Levels were 
taken from National Account Statistics and maturities were assumed to be identical to those of corporate bonds. 
Again. maturities for corporate bonds were obtained by counting lags. 
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Figure A3 
Gross flows from long-term loans as a percentage of physical investment 
The figure shows gross flows from long-term loan financing as a percentage of total capital expenditures of private 
non-financial companies in Japan. Germany and the U.S. Long-term loans to Japanese firms comprise of bank loans 
for equipment funds and other long-term loans that also include loans from other financial institutions (available from 
the Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations of the Ministry of Finance. series “long-term other borrowings”). 
Data on gross flows for equipment funds were directly taken from the statistical yearbook published by the Statistics 
Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Public Management. Home Affairs. Posts and Publication (series 11-19 (through 
1984) and series 13-24 (from 1985)). Gross flows for all other types of long-term loans. which accounted for roughly 
35 percent of total loans between  1970 and 2000. were estimated by means of equation ( 4) and based on the 
assumption that the average maturities in both loan categories are identical for the same time interval. Gross flows for 
German and US firms were also estimated by entering level data and maturity estimates into equation (4). Maturity 
estimates for loans to German firms were derived from the monthly bank statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
which distinguishes between loans with original maturities below and above 4 years (since 1998 a threshold of 5 years 
is used). Assuming average maturities of 2.5 years and 7 years. respectively. for the two categories yields an overall 
average maturity of 6.1 years. In its Flows of Funds Accounts the Federal Reserve groups both levels and net flows of 
loans to US firms into three categories: “bank loans not elsewhere classified”. “mortgages” and “other loans and 
advances”. The quarterly surveys of terms of business lending (statistical release E.2 of the Federal Reserve) which 
show weighted average maturities of all commercial and industrial loans that were granted by a sample of domestic 
and foreign commercial banks during a specified 5-day interval. indicate that loans in the first category have an 
average maturity of about one year. We hence treated them as short-term instruments. Most US mortgage loans 
amortize over 20-30 year periods. but usually require balloon payments after 10 to 15 years. Their average maturity 
should be comparable to mortgage bonds. According to data from Guedes/Opler (1996) the average maturity of 1.153 
mortgage bonds that were issued by US corporations between 1982 and 1993 was 21 years with the average duration 
being close to 8 years. Data from the Security Data Corporation for the years 1970-2000 confirms this range. Based on 
this evidence we used a constant 12-year average maturity for mortgage loans to estimate the corresponding gross 
flows. During our observation period loans from finance companies accounted for almost two thirds of “other loans 
and advances”. The remainder was contributed in about equal portions by foreign entities on the one hand and other 
domestic financial institutions such as banks. savings institutions and ABS issuers on the other hand. In its statistical 
release G.2 the Federal Reserve reports average maturities only for auto loans. Averaging over the years 1985-2000. 
for which maturity data was available. we arrive at an average maturity for auto loans of roughly 5 years. Therefore 
we applied a constant average maturity of 5 years to derive gross flows from “other loans and advances”. 
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